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Abstract  
What does gentrification mean under speculative urbanisation led by a strong 
developmental state? This paper analyses the contemporary history of Seoul’s urban 
redevelopment, arguing that new-build gentrification is an endogenous process 
embedded in Korea’s highly speculative urban development processes from the 1980s. 
Property owners, construction firms and local/central governments coalesce, facilitating 
the extraction of exchange value by closing the rent gap. Displacement of poorer owner-
occupiers and tenants was requisite for the success of speculative accumulation. 
Furthermore, the paper also contends that Korea’s speculative urbanisation under the 
strong developmental (and later (neo-)liberalising) state has rendered popular resistance 
to displacement ineffective despite its initial success in securing state concessions. 
Examining the experience of Seoul in times of condensed industrialisation and 
speculative urbanisation helps inform the existing literature on gentrification by 
resorting to non-Western empirics.  
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Introduction  
Much of the contemporary gentrification literature is rooted in the specific urban 
contexts of the Western, Anglophone world. The literature is sometimes accused of 
over-generalisation based on the selective experiences of a small number of cities like 
New York or London (Maloutas, 2012). For instance, the diagnosis of ‘three waves’ of 
gentrification in the United States (Hackworth and Smith, 2001) has sometimes been 
used as a template to determine the status of gentrification elsewhere despite the 
divergent geographical contingencies across countries. There have also been attempts to 
map the geographical spread of gentrification from the ‘centre’ (particularly the 
Anglophone world in the global North) to the ‘periphery’ (non-Anglophone and the 
global South) in a process that resembles colonisation (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; see 
Lees, 2012 for a critique). Neoliberal urbanisation and global policy mobility are 
thought to be facilitating the transformation of gentrification into a ‘global urban 
strategy’ (Smith, 2002). Gentrification researchers working in the global North have 
been increasingly drawn towards discussion of the (often punitive) urban policies put 
forward by neoliberal states to disassemble post-war welfare systems such as the social 
cleansing of London’s council estates (e.g. Lees, 2014). In London, for instance, new-
build developments along London’s riverside were found to be producing displacement 
pressures on neighbouring neighbourhoods by increasing further development potential 
and property values, thus leading to what has been coined ‘new-build gentrification’ 
(Davidson and Lees, 2010), identified as a mutated form of ‘third-wave gentrification’ 
in the post- recession era (Lees et al., 2008).  
We shift our focus now to cities in the global South and in particular those in Asia, 
where the gentrification literature has had a relatively limited presence. In recent years, 
increased attention is being paid to the understanding of an emergent gentrification in 
Asia (e.g. Harris, 2008; Lützeler, 2008), trying to unveil how contemporary urban 
restructuring and the resulting dispossession of urbanites have been influenced by 
changing urban forms, government policies, (transnational and domestic) capital, class 
restructuring, and so on. However, there is still a dearth of literature, especially in East 
Asia, where state intervention has been highly visible throughout the region’s 
condensed industrialisation and urbanisation. The literature also needs to account for 
intra-regional diversities, following the suggestion of Lees et al. (2008: 166) that ‘in the 
global South, gentrification as an urban strategy is playing out in even more diverse 
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ways’, as the region’s urbanisation ‘is driven by the simultaneous expansion of ‘‘old’’ 
and ‘‘new’’ spatial economic shifts.’ Furthermore, as Neil Smith (1986: 23) asserted, 
‘Different levels and kinds of state involvement give the process a very different form in 
different economies.’ It is therefore important to be sensitive about the ways in which 
gentrification has been territorialised in particular localities and interacts with other 
embedded (historical and contemporary) urban processes.  
In this respect, we visit the case study of Seoul in South Korea (hereafter Korea) to 
discuss how gentrification plays out in an economy that is heavily shaped and nurtured 
by strong state intervention. In part, we attempt to expand the existing gentrification 
debates by including a case that goes beyond the usual suspects in the global North 
(Lees, 2012; Lees et al., 2015). The condensed urbanisation and industrialisation led by 
the Korean developmental state fundamentally changed the country’s city-scape from 
the 1960s. After having gone through a trial-and-error period of eradicating widespread 
substandard, illegal settlements, the Korean developmental state implemented an urban 
redevelopment programme in 1983, which relied heavily on the joint collaboration 
between real estate businesses and property owners. The programme fundamentally fed 
upon Seoul’s highly speculative real estate market (Shin, 2009), promoting ‘vertical 
accumulation’ (Shin, 2011) that tried to maximise accumulation through high-density 
construction and has become the main feature of Korea’s urbanisation in recent decades. 
While the redevelopment projects from the 1980s might have contributed to the 
provision of much more improved physical conditions of living than what dilapidated 
neighbourhoods used to provide, these projects incurred a life of huge socio-economic 
hardship for most local residents due to their displacement and relocation (Davis, 2011; 
Shin, 2008). Homes affordable for poor families were subject to ‘domicide’ (Porteous 
and Smith, 2001), destroyed to make way for new infrastructure and commercial 
housing, and to cater for the needs of the country’s middle classes and addressing the 
state aspiration of beautification and modernisation. Embedded in this urban context, a 
case study of Seoul is a useful means by which to inform the existing literature on 
gentrification investigating non-Western empirics.  
In this paper, we prescribe to a broader definition of gentrification, which emphasises 
capital (re-)investment, commodification of space and (various forms of) displacement 
(Clark, 2005; Lees et al., 2008). We therefore keep a distance from a narrow 
conceptualisation that associates gentrification only with incremental upgrading of 
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dwellings or inner-city neighbourhoods, and from excessively associating gentrification 
with the specificities of Anglo-American metropolises only (e.g. Maloutas, 2012). 
Following Ley and Teo (2014), we also acknowledge that gentrification as a process 
may emerge and exist even if the concept itself is not sufficiently circulated in a society. 
Based on their extensive review of urban redevelopment in Hong Kong, Ley and Teo 
(2014: 1296) conclude that although gentrification is ‘simply missing from the urban 
vocabulary’, gentrification was/is firmly in place. The obscurity of the term is 
attributed, partly, to the particular culture of real estate that has become a major target 
of individual investment and partly to Hong Kong’s extensive provision of welfare 
housing.  
In Korea, gentrification has only gained its academic currency in recent years (e.g. Kim 
et al., 2010). Redevelopment (jaegaebal in Korean) and demolition (cheolgeo) are the 
terms that have been more widely circulated as popular, academic and policy 
expressions. To some extent, this is an outcome of confining gentrification to its classic 
form of inner-city residential upgrading. With few exceptions (e.g. Lee and Joo, 2008; 
Shin, 2009), gentrification has been regarded as being inapplicable to neighbourhood 
transformation through wholesale demolition and redevelopment (e.g. Kim and Nam, 
1998).  
By examining Seoul’s experience of urban redevelopment during the last 30 years, we 
argue that new-build gentrification is not just an attribute of the cities in the global 
North ruled by neoliberal ‘roll-out’ states (Davidson and Lees, 2010). In other words, 
new-build gentrification is an endogenous process embedded in Korea’s speculative 
urban development processes. However, Seoul’s new-build gentrification is not simply 
a replication of new-build gentrification in the global North, but a process that reveals 
distinctive characteristics due to the influence of the strong developmental (and later 
(neo-)liberalising) state. By adopting an evolutionary approach and making use of local 
historical archives, government records and authors’ first-hand research, this paper 
attempts to deliver a more in-depth, nuanced interpretation of Seoul’s history of urban 
development and gentrification.  
The rest of the paper consists of four sections. Firstly, we provide an analytical 
framework that brings together the importance of real estate (as part of the secondary 
circuit of capital accumulation) and the role of the developmental state, and discuss their 
relevance for gentrification. Secondly, we examine the history of Seoul’s urban 
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redevelopment during the last 30 years, examining how the developmental (and later 
(neo-)liberalising) state has shaped urban redevelopment practices that exhibit the key 
characteristics of new-build gentrification. This is followed by a section that discusses 
how the state and large businesses were taking an upper hand in promoting 
redevelopment, and how resistance to this was ineffective despite the colossal 
consequences for local residents. The final section brings together the main findings and 
makes a set of conclusions.  
 
Real estate, the developmental state and gentrification  
In discussing urban accumulation crises and the emergence of increasingly deregulated 
capitalism in the 1960s, Henri Lefebvre highlights the possibility of the real estate’s rise 
as a second sector of accumulation to address the inherent risks of falling rates of profits 
and heightened competition that capitalism faces in perpetuity. He argues that,  
As the principal circuit – current industrial production and the movable property 
that results – begins to slow down, capital shifts to the second sector, real estate. 
It can even happen that real-estate speculation becomes the principal source for 
the formation of capital, that is, the realization of surplus value. The second 
circuit supplants the first, becomes essential. (Lefebvre, 2003: 160)  
In line with Lefebvre’s argument, David Harvey (1978) also puts forward the concept of 
‘capital switching’ between different circuits of capital as a fix to (over-)accumulation 
crises. The secondary circuit of capital accumulation, that is, investment in the built 
environment (e.g. infrastructure and housing), gains particular importance due to its 
function of absorbing shocks generated from the primary circuit of industrial 
production. The shock absorption can occur in several ways. For instance, it may 
operate as a buffer to absorb low profitability in the production circuit and boost a 
sluggish economy. Classic examples would include the New Deal in times of the Great 
Depression in the US and more recently, China’s state-led investment in fixed assets as 
a pre-emptive means to generate economic development and advance urbanisation (see 
Shin, 2014).  
The rise of the secondary circuit of capital entails the inevitable ascendancy of ‘real 
estate (speculation, construction) …a circuit that runs parallel to that of industrial 
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production’ (Lefebvre 2003: 159). As capital feels the poisonous seduction of 
speculative profits from real estate, it is difficult to dismiss the speculative desire 
especially in times of global economic ups and downs affecting national economies. 
The rise of real estate accompanies spatial investment strategies in order to facilitate (re-
)valuation of real estate properties, producing speculative urban development 
(Goldman, 2011; Shin, 2014). Speculation also becomes rampant as obsolescence 
becomes ‘a neoliberal alibi for creative destruction’, which concentrates on areas with 
the highest returns on investment in a market that has been increasingly entwined with 
the global financial capital (Weber, 2002: 532). To help perpetuate this process, the 
local state ‘operates through decentralised partnerships with real-estate capitalists, and 
what remains of the local state structure has been refashioned to resemble the private 
sector, with an emphasis on customer service, speed, and entrepreneurialism’ (Weber, 
2002: 531).  
In this context of the rise of the real estate sector and intensifying state intervention in 
promoting speculative urbanisation, contemporary gentrification in the global North is 
increasingly characterised by large-scale real estate projects resulting in state-led, new-
build gentrification (Lees et al., 2008). Gentrification is no longer confined to its classic 
process of residential upgrading mostly focused on the dilapidated inner city. Real 
estate projects that accompany the redevelopment of existing residential, commercial or 
brownfield sites come to constitute new-build gentrification, which result in either 
direct or indirect displacement of residents in targeted project sites or in adjacent spaces 
(Davidson and Lees, 2010).  
East Asia, including Japan and tiger economies (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan) in particular, saw the heavy intervention of developmental states from the 
outset of their economic development and condensed urbanisation in the second half of 
the twentieth century. The East Asian developmental path was epitomised by 
centralised policy-making for economic growth, strong state intervention in investment 
decision-making, control of finance, export orientation, investment in human capital, 
the authoritarian control of civil society and close ties with business interests (Castells, 
1992; Woo-Cumings, 1999). The state-led investment to produce and expand fixed 
assets and collective consumption (esp. housing) was phenomenal. Depending on the 
nature of the state–economy and state– society relations, the particular type of 
prioritised collective consumption differed across countries. For instance, Singapore 
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focused more on the production of public housing to meet the demand from the 
coalition between the state and the popular sector, while in Korea, the strong alliance 
between the state and large conglomerates made public housing investment less of a 
priority (Park, 1998). Developmental state’s legitimacy depended on successfully 
guaranteeing the economic security of the national populace, co-opted into various state 
ideologies.  
East Asia’s condensed economic development and urbanisation were accompanied by 
the state-led, heavy investment in the built environment co-mingled with speculative 
real estate markets due to their land-scarce environment. As argued by Jang-sup Shin 
(2007), who emphasises the importance of the ‘stickiness’ of mobile assets (or capital) 
in the age of globalisation, improving the quality of the built environment has been one 
of the main urban accumulation strategies increasingly adopted by the East Asian states. 
Place promotion, beautification and mega-event promotion also helped East Asian states 
rewrite their urban landscapes. In Korea, subnational actors (e.g. Seoul municipal 
government or district governments within Seoul) were all in this together under the 
directives from the central government during the period of industrialisation and 
urbanisation. Government-owned development corporations such as the Korea Land 
Corporation and Korea National Housing Corporation played key roles in facilitating 
the state intervention in the built environment, often working with the private sector. 
While Korea experienced political decentralisation from the 1990s, having had the first 
election to elect district and municipal mayors, provincial governors (in 1995) and local 
assembly members (in 1991), sub-national actors are still bound by the growth politics 
that retained the investment in the built environment at its core (e.g. Park, 2008).  
It is in this context of state-led economic development and urbanisation that we aim to 
contextualise the prominence of state-led, new-build gentrification under the 
developmental state. Translating economic success into the urban landscape involved 
the wholesale clearance of dilapidated urban spaces and their replacement by upscale 
commercial and residential buildings and facilities. In other words, urban spaces seeing 
widened rent gaps were put into higher and better uses by the state, capitalists and the 
emergent middle-class populace, who would have shared profits from closing the rent 
gap (see Smith, 1996 for rent gap discussions). In Korea, this process was particularly 
pronounced from the early 1980s when the country was seeing the channelling of 
surplus capital into real estate to accumulate property assets. The 1980s saw declining 
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profit rates in the Korean economy compared to those experienced during the more 
labour-intensive growth under the developmental state in the 1960s and 1970s (see 
Shin, 2009). The surplus capital made its way into the secondary circuit, tapping into 
the speculative property market that had experienced major price increases. For 
instance, Jung (1998: 136) notes that,  
During the past twenty-two years from 1974 to 1996, land prices for all the 
nation’s land increased by 17.6 times, in rural areas by 10.2 times and in smaller 
cities by 20.2 times. However, land prices in the six largest cities increased by 
28.9 times, and in Seoul by 32.9 times.  
The Korean conglomerates were also heavily engaged in property speculation in the 
country’s real estate markets (Sohn, 2008: 116– 117). Not only were they operating 
major construction firms to reap profits from the state-financed restructuring of the built 
environment, but they also heavily acquired real estate holdings.1 For instance, in 1989, 
it was reported that these conglomerates had been possessing real estate properties 
whose total value reached more than a half of their combined equity capital (Sohn, 
2008).  
 
Urban (re)development and emerging new-build gentrification in Seoul  
 
The rise and containment of substandard settlements in the 1960s and 1970s  
Currently, Seoul accommodates more than 10 million people, about one-fifth of the 
national population. This stands in sharp contrast with the land situation: Seoul’s 
surface area occupies less than 1% of the national territory, therefore producing a very 
high population density of 17,000 people per square kilometre. Seoul has always 
experienced a high demand for residential land in times of rapid urbanisation and 
economic development from the 1960s. Migration of cheap labour to Seoul was one of 
the main drivers of economic development, but Seoul’s urban infrastructure, housing in 
particular, was hardly sufficient to cope with the demand rising from the rapid 
population increase. Illegal substandard settlements, known as panjachon in Korean 
(translated as ‘village of wooden-board framed houses’), sprung up in and around 
Seoul. Facing no alternatives, the municipality to some extent turned a blind eye to such 
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development. By 1966, according to an official count, there were approximately 
136,650 illegal dwellings, more than one-third of the total municipal housing stocks 
(Seoul Metropolitan Government; SMG, 1973: 185).  
Eventually, a series of government attempts took place to control the growth of such 
illegal settlements. The authoritarian state headed by the president who led a military 
coup in 1961 exercised draconian measures to suppress and contain the growth of 
substandard settlements, if not completely eradicate them. For instance, from 1972, 
Seoul’s aerial pictures were taken four times a year and 159 ground surveillance posts 
were erected in substandard settlements to map any new construction of illegal 
dwellings. Government officials deployed routine patrols while residents were 
encouraged to spy on neighbours to report any illegal construction (SMG, 1973: 192).  
Restraining the growth of exiting substandard settlements was accompanied by the 
development of large-scale new housing estates (known as danji in Korean) as part of 
the ten-year (1972–1981) housing construction programme (see Figure 1). This was to 
accommodate the demand for modern housing from the newly emerging middle class 
(Lee, 1994). The programme aimed at achieving an economy of scale and efficient land 
use, focusing on the then urban fringes to the south of the River Han where land 
assembly was relatively cheap and less confrontational due to a much scarcer density of 
population (Planning and Coordination for the Cabinet Office, 1972: 253–254). Each 
danji was huge in scale, comprising of about 27,000 flats in the case of Mokdong danji. 
New flats produced in the late 1970s became subject to rampant speculation. For 
instance, the total amount of deposits from applicants attracted to a sales announcement 
of new housing estates in 1977 by five construction companies amounted to about 4.6% 
of the national money supply at the time (Mobrand 2008:382). In short, the new housing 
construction drew an intense degree of interest from both homebuyers and speculators, 
which in turn led to the emergence of housing redevelopment targeting substandard 
settlements in Seoul’s more central areas to exploit the developmental potential.  
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Figure 1. View of Banpo medium-rise apartment danji, completed in the 1970s.  
Source: Photograph from Seoul History Compilation Committee 2008  
 
Figure 2. Ogsu neighbourhood before and after redevelopment (project period: 
November 1984 - October 1990). 
Source: Photographs provided through the courtesy of The Seoul Institute 
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Property-led redevelopment since the 1980s  
One of the pilot redevelopment programmes experimented in the 1970s was called the 
‘consignment redevelopment.’ It required owner-occupiers in substandard settlements to 
form a steering committee and consign to a private builder the clearance of dwellings 
and construction of new flats or multi-household units. In situ upgrading without 
demolition was not favoured by the municipality who preferred to establish a ‘modern’ 
facade of the city (Kim et al., 1996: 95–101; SMG, 1983: 335–336). The municipality 
was to recommend credible builders and conduct supervision. Each project was small-
scale, requiring 20–30 households to join hands so that about 1000-square-metre 
housing lot could be assembled (Kim et al., 1996: 96). Eventually, the programme was 
not successful: only 2253 dwellings in 12 project areas were redeveloped in this way 
(Kim et al., 1996). Major constraints were the large costs of reconstruction and 
temporary relocation, which burdened the participating owner-occupiers.  
Having learnt from the 1970s, the municipal government introduced a revised policy in 
1983 (The KyungHyang Shinmun, 1984), which became the model for subsequent 
redevelopment programmes in following decades. The programme, known as the ‘Joint 
Redevelopment Programme’ (hereafter JRP), largely depended on the use of joint 
contributions from local property owners (mostly dwelling owners) and builders that 
supplied development finance and carried out construction and marketing (Ha, 2001; 
Shin, 2009). Unlike the 1970s, the JRP was to substantially increase the scale of 
reconstruction, facilitated by the growing popularity of high-rise apartments among the 
emerging middle classes for the purpose of both consumption and investment (see 
Figure 2).  
In substandard settlements subject to the JRP, the majority of dwellings were without de 
jure property ownership as they had no land titles (SMG, 1998: 20–21). As the 1973 
Temporary Act prohibited any upgrading of existing dwellings to prevent the spread 
and expansion of such settlements, owner-occupiers in these settlements faced 
unfavourable conditions in terms of investment in their own properties. This condition 
also prevented the arrival of middle class households as individual gentrifiers, and in 
turn discouraged the rise of ‘first-wave’ gentrification (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). 
The suppression of development however created a massive rent gap (Shin, 2009), thus 
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opportunities for reaping profits once these settlements became subject to commercial 
redevelopment and closure of the rent gap.  
The introduction of the JRP as a redevelopment model can be understood more as the 
gradual evolution of endogenous policies. While it is not possible to verify if the 
national or municipal government imported or consulted a particular overseas policy 
due to limited availability of interviewees or official archives, the combination of state 
assistance, corporate interests and commercial redevelopment targeting large-scale 
substandard and illegal settlements would be considered as a highly unprecedented 
urban policy in the global South at the time. The summary of ad hoc communications 
with a former housing official who served in the municipality between 1992 and 1997 
also testifies that the JRP introduction was embedded in Seoul’s particular urban 
contexts:  
The JRP was an eye-opening idea. Seoul at the time was facing the hosting of 
the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympic Games, and was in need 
of redeveloping panjachon. But, this was going to be impossible if previous 
methods were used, given local residents’ economic hardship and the 
government’s financial capacity. Construction firms were in need of projects, 
and if they were to provide money and take the responsibility, the government 
would not have to worry any more. At first, it was just a trial, but it quickly 
spread to cover the entire city, testifying the formidable power of the 
combination of local residents and capital, thus joint redevelopment. 
Development profits were the main impetus of the JRP promotion. (Meeting on 
30 September 2013 and telephone communication on 1 November 2013)  
Seoul’s housing market, especially the emergent high-rise apartment sector, was seeing 
a speculative boom throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This meant that construction firms 
were able to reap profits by selling commercial new-build flats in the new housing 
market (after deducting flats to be sold to participating property owners at construction 
costs). High-density construction was therefore crucial (Shin, 2011). Government data 
examining 65 JRP districts between 1990 and 1996 suggest that the number of 
dwellings experienced a 303% increase after redevelopment, while the number of 
residents witnessed a 32% increase (SMG 1998: 32). In other words, redevelopment 
resulted in the construction of more spacious single-family units in neighbourhoods that 
used to experience house-sharing and overcrowded conditions. The floor-to-area ratio 
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(hereafter FAR; the ratio of gross floor space to the land surface area that a building 
occupies) of redeveloped districts during this period often reached 300% or higher. The 
high-density redevelopment was supported by various government incentives to help 
property owners lessen their burden of paying for construction and guaranteeing a 
certain amount of profits for builders. If poorer property owners opted out of a project, 
they sold the right (to buy a redeveloped flat at construction costs) to speculators or 
first-time homebuyers at a price that was determined somewhere between the price of 
existing dwellings (before the arrival of redevelopment) and the subsidised price of new 
flats they were originally entitled to pay as a member of the redevelopment association. 
This would have resulted in what López-Morales (2011) referred to as ‘ground rent 
dispossession’, a situation in which property owners were disadvantaged in fully 
appropriating potential ground rent. The dispossession of this nature also becomes the 
basis for the rise of speculative activities by absentee landlords and developers (see 
Shin, 2009).  
 
Densification of old residential units in the 1990s  
The redevelopment of substandard settlements was accompanied by the densification of 
existing low-rise detached houses in formal, established neighbourhoods. House owners 
rebuilt their one- or two-storey detached dwellings to convert them into multi-household 
units that were usually three- to four-stories high excluding the basement (see Figure 3). 
The municipal government contributed to this process by relaxing planning regulations 
(e.g. easing the requirements for a minimum distance between dwellings or the 
provision of parking spaces). Small-scale builders were naturally the main participants 
in this segment of the housing market.  
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Figure 3. Neighbourhood with a concentration of multi-household dwellings. 
Source: Photograph by Hyun Bang Shin in 2002  
Each densified multi-household dwelling was subdivided to be rented out. Usually a 
detached dwelling for one family was densified and then subdivided to provide living 
space for five households. The authors’ own estimation from the municipal government 
data suggests that about 750,000 multi-household units were produced between 1990 
and 2001, accounting for about 66% of all housing units produced in Seoul in this 
period. Approximately 150,000 detached dwellings are estimated to have been 
demolished in this process. These multi-household dwellings contributed to the 
expansion of more affordable housing stocks with flexible tenure for low-income urban 
residents (Shin, 2008), but as a neighbourhood, what prevailed were worsening living 
conditions due to inadequate provision of parking spaces, narrow streets and the 
absence of green or recreational spaces.  
 
Reconstruction of medium-rise apartments between the mid-1990s and 2000s  
From the mid-1990s, Seoul saw the expansion of urban redevelopment targeting extant 
medium-rise estates to a higher density. This process was initially concentrated in south 
Seoul where large-scale danji estates were previously constructed. The redevelopment 
of medium-rise housing estates is often referred to as ‘reconstruction’ or jaegeonchug in 
Korean to differentiate it from the redevelopment of substandard settlements classified 
as jaegaebal. The reconstruction adopted the JRP model. Each project was to be 
initiated by the property owners’ association (known as reconstruction association, 
Page | 15 
 
again to differentiate it from redevelopment association for substandard settlement 
redevelopment), which would also include a construction firm or a consortium of firms. 
The increase in building density and in the number of flats as a result of reconstruction 
allowed the reconstruction committee (consisted of flat owners and collaborating 
construction firms) to sell additional commercial flats on the new housing market. The 
sales revenues would help lower the overall construction costs for existing owners and 
ensure a certain level of profits and speculative gains for both owners and construction 
firms. Only members of reconstruction association were to reap the benefits, as was the 
case in the previous JRP structure.  
The reconstruction of existing apartment complexes became popular between 1998 and 
2007, in particular when Korea was recovering from the aftermath of the 1997– 1998 
Asian financial crisis. According to the 2008 Housing Handbook from the Ministry of 
Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, 94,492 flats were demolished during the ten-year 
period, followed by the reconstruction of about 180,562 flats. These accounted for about 
14% of all apartment units in Seoul as of 2007. Given the large-scale nature of projects 
that required a huge amount of upfront financial input, reconstruction projects were 
mostly led by large construction firms (as was the case in JRP projects). The popularity 
of construction firms and their housing brand became an important factor that 
determined the price of reconstructed flats. Major firms associated with the largest 
conglomerates such as Hyundai, Samsung and Daewoo became the most sought-after 
brand names among flat owners in this regard.  
 
Redevelopment of high density low-rise residential areas in the 2000s  
From 2002, Seoul’s urban redevelopment expanded to address high-density low-rise 
residential areas where multi-household dwellings were concentrated. This was 
promoted under the label of ‘New Town Programme’ (NTP). As the then mayor 
indicated at the opening ceremony of a pilot project site in March 2004, ‘the project 
aims to create another city within a city’ (SMG, 2004). As of July 2010, 35 mega-
districts were designated, which included 372 subdistricts (SMG, 2010). This covered a 
total area of 27.34 square kilometres, about 6% of Seoul’s surface area. As of 
September 2008, 350,000 households (850,000 people or 8% of the municipal 
population) were subject to the NTP (Jang and Yang, 2008). Of these, 69% or 230,000 
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households were tenants, and the municipal planning aimed to reduce the share of tenant 
households to 19.2% upon programme completion (Jang and Yang, 2008).  
The NTP was led by the municipal government from its birth, which was also heavily 
politicised due to the then Seoul mayor who had an aspiration to secure national 
presidency. This situation was further exacerbated as the NTP also responded to the 
speculative aspiration held by those property owners who did not benefit from the 
previous rounds of JRP. Major builders also welcomed the policy as it promised the 
emergence of another market for their operation. To ensure the success of the pilot 
projects at the NTP outset, the municipality was put ‘in charge of building public 
facilities’ and the municipal development corporation ‘responsible for implementing 
housing development work’ (Korea Herald, 2002).  
The NTP aimed at scaling up redevelopment projects so that a number of outdated 
residential neighbourhoods and urban facilities would come together to form a mega- 
district. Like in JRP projects, demolition and reconstruction were perceived as the norm. 
After piloting, private builders took more initiatives for housing development at the 
subdistrict scale, adopting either a JRP-style redevelopment model or the 1990s’ 
reconstruction model. Nevertheless, the municipal government made comprehensive 
efforts to ensure the success of the NTP, including the establishment of a separate 
division to oversee the progress, publishing regular progress newsletters for publicity.  
However, the NTP caused a substantial reduction in affordable housing stocks for low-
income residents who were concentrated in multi-household dwellings, especially after 
the demise of panjachon settlements. The interim evaluation suggested that about 80% 
of original residents were leaving project sites due to rising housing costs. In 
comparison with JRP projects, dwelling owners were more likely to lose out due to the 
increase in financial contributions (Kim, 2010). Neighbourhoods with multi-household 
dwelling concentration were experiencing already fairly high FAR of 200%, and there 
was a higher share of tenants’ households whose demand for compensation (both in-
kind and in-cash) would place additional constraints upon financial outlook of each 
NTP project. Under these circumstances, the weakening real estate market resulting 
from the 2008 global financial crisis also made it financially difficult for property 
owners and construction firms in particular, who became more wary of the uncertain 
business outlook (Ha, 2010).  
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A summary of Seoul’s redevelopment history  
Urban redevelopment through the demolition of substandard settlements and existing 
medium-rise apartment complexes brought about profound changes to Seoul’s 
landscape. Seoul’s urban transformation therefore shows a strong resemblance with 
new-build gentrification, incurring the displacement of the majority of low-income 
owner-occupiers and tenants from their original neighbourhoods. While there are no 
data showing the scale of displacement since the implementation of the JRP, reports 
suggest that about 0.75 million residents faced eviction between 1983 and 1988, which 
amounted to 8;9% of the then municipal population (ACHR, 1989). Reports also 
suggest that JRP projects saw nearly four-fifths of original residents displaced 
permanently (Ha, 2004). Official municipal records for JRP projects completed between 
1993 and 1996 indicated that 84% of tenants and 55% of dwelling owners were 
permanently displaced (Kim et al., 1996: 221). The situation has been replicated in NTP 
projects (Jang and Yang, 2008). Table 1 summarises the scale of redevelopment over 
the years. The table also includes a summary of key events in South Korea.  
The involvement of large construction companies with a strong capacity to mobilise 
financial resources was important especially because of the immense scale of each 
redevelopment project. The largest neighbourhoods subject to redevelopment could 
accommodate as many as 5738 households (Kim et al., 1996). According to the data 
from the municipal government, the average number of demolished dwellings from 211 
redevelopment projects (completed by the end of 2010) turned out to be 379 units, while 
the average number of newly constructed flats reached 977 units.  
 
Speculative desire and the politics of displacement  
Gentrification is not an automated process and socio-political struggles matter (Shin, 
2009). These struggles are of crucial importance especially for poor owner-occupiers 
and tenants who bear the brunt of redevelopment in the form of involuntary 
displacement. From the early 1980s Seoul’s redevelopment resorted to the collective 
mobilisation of property owners whose shared material interests brought them together. 
The material interests here largely refer to the increased exchange value of their 
Table.1: The scale of major redevelopment programmes in Seoul and the summary of key events 
Source: Kim (2010), Jang and Yang (2008) and Seoul municipal government data 
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properties (therefore, development gains) overshadowing enhanced use value (improved 
living conditions). Studies, however, find that existing property owners were replaced 
by speculative absentee landlords as projects progressed (Shin, 2009). By the time 
demolition took place the share of owner-occupiers in the total number of property 
owners tended to be in the range of 20;30% only. This imbalance becomes the source of 
a redevelopment association being influenced by outsiders’ interests rather than those of 
local residents. Ironically, this would translate into a more financially sound project.  
Absentee landlords tend to take the side of construction firms as they share common 
objectives: to displace existing tenants quickly and demolish dwellings to shorten the 
project schedule and prevent the unnecessary rise in overall costs. This becomes one of 
the major reasons behind the frequent use of violent measures to remove physical and 
human barriers to redevelopment. The compensation provision is also meant to affect 
only the officially recognised last-remaining residents subject to displacement, 
disregarding other forms such as chain displacement that occur before last-resident 
displacement) (Marcuse, 1985). Property owners and builders often strive to reduce the 
number of last-remaining eligible tenants to minimise the official costs of 
compensation, especially the costly provision of redevelopment rental flats.2  
Displacement of poor owner-occupiers and tenants has thus been the inevitable outcome 
of Seoul’s urban redevelopment (Kim et al., 1998). The flow of capital into 
redevelopment areas was affecting the whole of Seoul with no evident concentration in 
inner-city areas (see Figure 4). Upon introducing the JRP in 1983, there was no 
compensation arrangement for tenants. Against the backdrop of heightened 
democratisation movements in the 1980s and the early 1990s, the large-scale 
displacement of tenants became a major source of discontent (ACHR, 1989). The 
demolition of the most affordable and flexible means of residence such as panjachon 
invoked great difficulties for poor tenants in particular (Shin, 2008). Tenants’ struggles 
against forced eviction and their call for housing rights were often undermined by the 
brutal oppression of the authoritarian state, which prioritised urban beautification and 
portrayed evictees’ protests as threatening national stability (Kim et al., 1998). 
Protestors were also often stigmatised as being motivated by self-interests for more 
compensation, pursuing personal interests at the expense of public gains, an experience 
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country propelled active intervention in policy-making processes, the housing rights 
movement also gravitated towards legal systems to improve the general housing welfare 
for the urban poor (e.g. setting up a minimum housing standard) (Lee, 2012) rather than 
resistance to displacement.  
While the provision of redevelopment rental flats could be deemed as progress, this was 
not hugely popular among tenants as these rental flats did not fully address tenants’ 
household economies and tenure preferences (Shin, 2008). The lack of provision of 
temporary relocation measures while the construction took place added further 
constraints. Tenants, in their post-redevelopment life in rehoused public rental flats have 
also been known to face social discrimination. Redeveloped neighbourhoods see the 
juxtaposition of luxury commercial flats with public rental flats, showing a social mix 
of tenure at the neighbourhood scale. However, incidents of discrimination by better-off 
residents against public tenants have become a major source of concern since the 1990s 
(Ha, 2008). Furthermore, compensation measures only benefited JRP tenants and did 
not help tenants displaced due to the reconstruction of more established apartment 
estates – jaegeonchug. The primary rationale behind this was the government 
classification of the former as serving the public interests, while the latter was treated as 
being exclusively in the private domain. This unequal treatment placed the issue of 
redevelopment compensation for tenants as if it was part of welfare provision for the 
urban poor rather than housing rights in general.  
Developmental states are known to have co-opted the general population in their pursuit 
for rapid economic development and societal stability (frequently through authoritarian 
means) to maximise the mobilisation of resources and their productive use (Woo-
Cumings, 1999). Despite the suppression of democratic processes and civil society, 
state legitimacy is often secured through getting things done and raising the living 
standard. For the emerging middle class, the speculative desire to accumulate property 
assets often leads to the perception of redevelopment as a societal progress as Tang 
(2008) noted. Viewed as the ‘culture of property’ by Ley and Teo (2014), this tendency 
may impel people to keep distance from denunciating redevelopment projects and 
displacement. Hsu and Hsu (2013) also refer to the ‘political culture of property’ in 
Taiwan, which privileged property ownership and supported close collaboration 
between real-estate developers and landowners for property-led redevelopment since the 
2000s. In such contexts, displacement is taken as an inevitable pre-condition of 
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progress, and the civil society may be discouraged from setting a progressive agenda to 
fight negative consequences of redevelopment.  
In Korea, this mechanism had been undermining popular resistance against eviction, 
albeit sporadic upheavals, and hindering movements from strengthening until the 
country’s real estate market started to dramatically weaken in recent years. Now, the 
weakening real estate market is ironically providing a renewed opportunity for critical 
urban scholars and social movements to produce alternative perspectives and strategies 
to resist the class re-making of urban space.  
 
Conclusion: Gentrification in Seoul as an endogenous process  
This paper on the place-specificity of gentrification in Seoul contests the view that 
gentrification travels from its ‘originating centre’ to ‘peripheral cities’ (Atkinson and 
Bridge, 2005). It is shown instead that the emergence of Seoul’s gentrification can be 
regarded as an endogenous process, embedded in Korea’s construction of speculative 
urban development. From its birth, Seoul’s gentrification has been a process of socio-
spatial restructuring at the municipal scale. Instead of individual upgrading, Seoul’s 
gentrification has been characterised by the demolition of entire neighbourhoods to 
make way for new-build housing estates, catering for the needs of the country’s middle-
class populace. Displacement is at the core of this transformative process of converting 
neighbourhoods into a ‘higher and better’ use to close the rent gap (Smith, 1996; Slater 
2009). However, Seoul’s gentrification is not simply mimicking the new-build 
gentrification in the global North, as the process is heavily influenced by the strong 
developmental, and later (neo-)liberalising, state. Furthermore, despite its potential, 
displacement has failed to become a major political agenda. This owes partly to the 
brutal suppression of residents’ protests against forced eviction, reflecting the 
authoritarian nature of developmental states inherent among the newly industrialised 
economies and partly to the state concession to co-opt those discontented. The provision 
of public rental housing as part of in-kind compensation for eligible tenants was clearly 
conforming to the latter strategy.  
Seoul’s experience of gentrification allows us to expand the gentrification debates on 
cities outside of the usual suspects of the global North by situating Seoul’s ‘new-build’ 
gentrification in the context of the speculative and exploitative process of extracting 
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exchange value from the built environment (Harvey, 1978; Lefebvre, 2003). 
Substandard settlements and other neighbourhoods subject to redevelopment became 
conduits for capital that speculated on the real estate and benefited from increased 
ground rents (Desai and Loftus, 2013; Goldman, 2011; López-Morales, 2011; Shin, 
2009). The role of the Korean developmental state is noteworthy, broadening our 
understanding of the global geography of gentrification. By employing a critical 
understanding of the political economy of urban spatial restructuring, the case of the 
endogenous emergence of gentrification in Seoul shows that the exploitative process of 
gentrification and displacement is inevitable when central and local states are keen to 
facilitate urban accumulation via the secondary circuit of the built environment (see also 
Lees et al., 2015). Contemporary gentrification researchers often associate the global 
spread of gentrification with the neoliberal expansion of urban policies. This paper 
contends that gentrification transcends the realm of neoliberal ‘roll-out’ states and is 
also heavily influenced by the proactive intervention of developmental states in 
constructing speculative built environments. The process of gentrification in Seoul 
could not have been consolidated without the presence of those large conglomerates as 
the major partners of the Korean developmental state. The paper therefore highlights the 
importance of investigating and contextualising the nature and role of real estate capital 
and its relationship with the state in gentrification debates.  
Does the neoliberalisation of the Korean developmental state, as argued by some 
commentators (e.g. Choi, 2012), produce any significant changes to the patterns of 
gentrification? In answer to this question, we argue that continuity has been the essence 
of urban redevelopment practices in Korea under both the pre-crisis developmental state 
and post-crisis (neo-)liberalising developmental state. The fundamental investment 
structure and institutional set-up, which shaped the geography of urban redevelopment, 
witnessed some changes (e.g. a more comprehensive area-based approach in the NTP), 
but they displayed a certain degree of continuity in terms of policy scope and key 
emphasis. To the extent that the developmental state placed a heavy emphasis on market 
orientation and proactive entrepreneurial state intervention in urban redevelopment, it 
could also be argued that the Korean developmental state befriended neoliberalisation. 
Neoliberal governance emphasises partnership or coalition with business interests (and 
sometimes with civil society) to enhance economic competence and ensure market 
supremacy (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The emergence of this neoliberal governance 
was not something alien to the developmental state that was already founded on a strong 
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alliance with business interests and co-opted the national populace while suppressing 
social movements. The legacy of the developmental state era would prevail, as the state 
and large conglomerates continued to be important actors in shaping and formulating 
urban mega-projects and housing construction. To this extent, we concur with the 
notion of ‘hybridity’ in urban policy formation, which draws upon the idea that state 
policies under neoliberalisation contain both elements of ‘neoliberalism’ and 
‘developmentalism’ (Choi, 2012; Park et al., 2012). The concept also emphasises the 
persistent manifestation of developmental characteristics in the process of 
neoliberalisation. As far as Seoul’s urban redevelopment and gentrification is 
concerned, state intervention in the built environment has been persistent regardless of 
Korea’s economic liberalisation.  
So what will be the future of Seoul’s gentrification? The future depends largely on the 
degree of the vibrancy of the real estate market. A particular culture of property 
prevails, dictating that property investment in redeveloped neighbourhoods will produce 
a certain amount of return on financial input. It is however doubtful if this practice 
would continue in the future. To some extent, the global financial crisis in 2008 has 
undermined the confidence of property-based interests in the real estate market (Ha, 
2010). Korea also experiences one of the lowest birth rates in the world, leading to the 
fear of a rapidly ageing society, raising doubts about future housing demand. As the 
myth of property investment withers away, the state’s legitimacy may also be shaken, 
leading to the rise of discontent. How this will all influence urban redevelopment and 
gentrification will need to be closely examined in the coming years.  
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Notes  
 1. See Pirie (2008) for his account of the Korean market and firm activities.  
 2. Chain displacement refers to the displacement of those households who used to 
occupy a dwelling before the ‘last-remaining’ household and who were 
displaced due to the dwelling’s physical decline or rent increases. Such 
households are often hidden from the actual estimation of displaced households 
even though their displacement might have occurred during the entire process of 
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